Elinor Ostrom's Contribution to Economic Governance

In general there are two main governance structures that are widely accepted in the literature; market or government oriented solutions. The eminent free-rider problem thwart social optimality when individuals do not coordinate their actions and cooperation cannot be accomplished internally. Ostrom argues against both of the external mechanisms and, through her extensive fieldwork, shows that self-governance is possible where communities develop their ruling systems to manage common pool resources. Her findings clearly indicate that rules imposed or dictated have little legitimacy and would be violated. On the contrary, when there is consensus on the governing principles or internal enforcement apparatuses people tend to obey them. This presentation aims to delve into more details of her criticisms of standard economic governance theories. Then, her contributions to collective decision making and her policy suggestions are discussed.

Anil Duman has received her MA and PhD in Economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Her research interests include political economy, economic development, welfare state policies, and comparative economic systems. Recently, she has been specializing on labor market institutions, social security regimes and their interactions.

The event is organized by International Association of Political Science Students (IAPSS) at CEU.