Philosophy of Language
Level:
Master's Course Status:
Core CEU credits:
2 ECTS credits:
4 Academic year:
2009/2010 Semester:
Fall Host Unit:
Department of Philosophy Academic Program:
Master of Arts in Philosophy CEU Instructor(s):
Hanoch Ben-Yami Additional information:
Recommended General Readings:
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim 1999, Language and Reality, 2nd edition, MIT Press.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin (eds.) 1997, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell.
Neale, Stephen 1990, Descriptions, MIT Press.
Devitt and Sterelny’s book is a good standard introduction to contemporary philosophy of language. It contains much more material than we shall discuss in our course, and can therefore also serve to complement the course. Hale and Wright’s book contains essays on most central issues in the Philosophy of Language, although these tend to be more advanced and one-sided than one would expect from a companion. Neale’s book, despite its specific subject, can serve as a useful and clear introduction to most issues discussed in our course, as these come up in his discussion of attempts to criticize or defend Russell’s analysis. Required Readings Link:
Assessment :
two-year MA: final written exam; one-year MA: term paper. Full description:
Breakdown into units
Topic I: Definite Descriptions
Unit 1
- Russell, Bertrand 1905, ‘On Denoting’, Mind, no. 56: 479-93.
In this paper, which in many respects served as a model for future work in Analytic Philosophy, Russell not only develops his celebrated theory of descriptions, but also discusses the methodology of the Philosophy of Language, sets an example of logico-linguistic analysis that would serve as paradigm for much further work, formulates the types of questions which he thinks it should discuss, and more.
Recommended optional readings:
Several of the other units in our course will discuss Russell’s claims in this paper, and thus no specific optional reading is necessary at this stage. Students may however wish to consult the following collections of articles:
- Mind Centenary Special Issue, October 2005, celebrating the centenary of Russell’s essay, and including some essays by prominent contemporary philosophers.
- Reimer, Marga and Bezuidenhout, Anne (eds.) 2004, Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford: Clarendon Press. A collection of essays (17) by well-known philosophers and linguists, which also gives a good picture of contemporary approaches in semantics and the philosophy of language.
Unit 2
- Strawson, Peter 1950, ‘On Referring’, rep. in his 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen: London, pp. 1-27.
The most important criticism of Russell’s description theory, which also set the stage for an alternative approach in the philosophy of language. It also contains criticisms of the predicate calculus and partial rehabilitation of Aristotelian logic.
Recommended optional readings:
- Russell, Bertrand 1957, ‘Mr. Strawson on Referring’, Mind 66: 385‑9.
- Sellars, Wilfred 1954, ‘Presupposing’, Philosophical Review 63: 197-215.
- Strawson, P. F. 1954, ‘Reply to Mr. Sellars’, Philosophical Review 63: 216‑31.
- Strawson, P. F. 1964, ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-Values’, rep. in his 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen: London: 75-95.
- Williamson, T. and Stanley, J. 1995, ‘Quantifiers and Context-Dependence’, Analysis 55:291‑5.
Russell’s reply to Strawson is of course interesting, although it is not Russell at his best. Sellars was the first to powerfully defend Russell against some of Strawson’s strong objections. In his 1964 paper Strawson elaborated his position to a more powerful one, and distinguished between essential and less substantial points, a distinction not always clear to his critics. Williamson and Stanley show that a Strawsonian criticism directed at definite descriptions is equally applicable to a wide range of quantifiers, which in a way makes it less effective.
Unit 3
- Donnellan, Keith 1966, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, Philosophical Review 75: 281-304.
In this paper Donnellan tries to draw a distinction between two uses of descriptions, referential and attributive, a distinction that became central to much later philosophy of language.
Recommended optional readings:
- MacKay, Alfred F. 1968, ‘Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring’, Philosophical Review 77: 197-202.
- Donnellan, Keith 1966, ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again’, Philosophical Review 77: 203-215.
- Sainsbury, Mark 2005, Reference without Referents, Oxford University Press.
Donnellan tries to clarify his distinction apropos MacKay’s criticism. Sainsbury, in section 5.2.4 (pp.188-191), claims that Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions is, in one sense, a distinction between two referential uses of descriptions, yet he maintains much of the distinction.
Unit 4
- Kripke, Saul 1972/1980, Naming and Necessity, Preface and Lecture I. Oxford: blackwell.
Probably the most influential work in Philosophy of Language in the last forty years. We shall concentrate on Kripke's modal criticism of the description theory of names, and discuss his concept of rigidity.
Topic II: Two Dogmas?
Units 5 & 6
- Quine, Willard van Orman ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, rep. in his 1961, From a Logical Point of View, second edition, Harvard University Press, pp. 20-46.
- Grice, Paul and Strawson, Peter 1956, ‘In Defense of a Dogma’, rep. in Grice, Paul 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, pp. 196-212.
Quine’s paper contains his attack on the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and his confirmation holism. Grice and Strawson supply a most powerful criticism of Quine’s arguments against the analytic–synthetic distinction. These two papers also represent different explanatory methodologies and imply a wider view of the aim of philosophy.
Recommended optional readings:
- Carnap, Rudolf 1955, ‘Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages’, Philosophical Studies 6: 33-47.
- Quine, W v O 1963, ‘Carnap on Logical Truth’, reprinted in his 1976, The Ways of the Paradox, Cambridge, Mass: 107-132.
- Pigden, C.R. 1987, ‘Two Dogmatists’, Inquiry 30.
- Strawson, P. F. 1957, ‘Propositions, Concepts, and Logical Truth’, reprinted in his 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen: London: 116-129.
Carnap’s is his defense of the analytic–synthetic distinction. Quine’s paper is another version of this criticism. Pigden’s is an interesting attempt to defend Quine from Grice and Strawson’s criticism. Strawson’s 1957 paper is a criticism of Quine’s attempt to preserve logical truth while rejecting analyticity.
Topic III: Beyond Assertion
Unit 7
- Austin, John L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. OUP. Chapters I & II, pp. 92‑3, and Chapters VIII & IX.
In the first two chapters Austin introduces the performative sentence, distinguishes it from assertion or the ‘constative’ sentence, and investigates its characteristics. In chapters VIII and IX (pp. 92‑3 contain some definitions necessary for their understanding) Austin distinguishes between the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of speech acts. These distinctions are important both for assessing other uses of the indicative sentence apart from its use to make assertions, and the implication this has to our understanding of meaning; and for the recognition of various aspects of the use of language.
Recommended optional readings:
- Strawson, P. F. 1957, ‘Intention and Convention in Speech Acts’, reprinted in his 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, Methuen: London: 149-169.
In the first two sections Strawson shows that illocutionary acts need not be conventional, Austin’s claim to the contrary notwithstanding. The rest of the paper contains an implausible elaboration of Grice’s implausibly elaborated theory of meaning, and an attempt to explain by it some features of illocutionary acts.
Unit 8
- Grice, Paul 1967, 1987, ‘Logic and Conversation’, chaps. 1-3, rep. in his 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.
The important development of Grice of the distinction between what is said and what is implied, in some sense, by what is said. A paradigm of systematic and meticulous philosophical work. Grice situates his distinctions within a wider theory or communication and rationality, and a view of language’s place in our life.
Unit 9
- Kripke, Saul (1977) ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, II, pp. 255-76.
In this paper Kripke tries to apply Grice’s distinction between semantic meaning and speaker’s meaning to the case of reference. Despite its wide influence, the distinction is quite problematic. The paper also discusses questions of methodology.
Recommended optional readings:
- Devitt, Michael (1981b) ‘Donnellan’s Distinction’, in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. K. Wettstein (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 511-24.
Contains, among other things, a criticism of Kripke’s distinction.
Topic IV: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language
Unit 10f
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1952) Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition 1958, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
The most important work in the philosophy of language in the 20th century. We shall devote to it the rest of the course—number of classes depends on the number of classes the earlier units will take.
